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Family Faces Berel Lang 
PARENTS 
WHEN WE HARDEN ourselves, break the surface of appear 
ances, we find ourselves face to face with biology?and so also in the 
case of parents. It takes years for children (that is, everybody) to see 
through childhood, those hazy years of wanting and growing, moving 
from suspicion to knowledge, the whole tinged with a presence that 
never wavers, that is close by even when brutal or estranged. The voices, 
the gestures, the rhythms, the commands?who can sort them out? 
Many children never do: the demands and the gifts are too harsh. No 
child ever does it all. 
But this sense of incompleteness also mirrors in consciousness the 
necessity of nature. For the main answer to its own puzzle is there, we 
recognize, in the question itself: someone must give creation a push and 
the wherewithal?and that, after all, is what we name as parent. This 
makes parenthood as well as the child himself a biological event, and 
few would quarrel with the justice of that claim. Yet this cannot be the 
whole of the matter; we see this quickly with the imagined existence 
of children born without parents. Let us?their creators?not worry 
how it happens; they step into life: healthy, active, intelligent. To make 
certain of their independence, let them be born as biological adults, with 
a language, with professions, with techniques for survival. The one 
thing they lack, that they have no means of looking back on or discover 
ing, is a set of parents. They are not orphaned, not adopted; they simply 
do not have origins. All that we ask of them is that they should go about 
the business of living. 
As 
slight a request, it turns out, as to live and sport in the thin air 
of Everest. For what would we do if literally we had to make ourselves? 
Could a person spin himself of whole cloth? The evidence is all the other 
way. Orphans never, in the whole of their lives, accommodate to the 
loss; and children who discover the imposture of adoptive parents seek 
perpetually for a glimpse of biological reality. It matters little to them 
what brutality or misery stood at their beginnings?and why should it? 
They search not for kindness or generosity, not even for penitence or 
love?only for the evidence that they have antecedents. Only then can 
they escape the suspicion that refuses to quit?that having first created 
themselves, they must, through the rest of their lives, go on doing this. 
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Invidiously, cruelly, intolerantly, we do not speak of adults whose 
parents die as orphans. This is partly because adults have lost the antici 
pation, the disarray of the child: they are too tired, fed too much by a 
sense of self, to feel the absence of others exactly as their own. But more 
important, they have memory, the recollection of origins which al 
though only a myth?painted, shaped?supports them in their age. 
Sartre, that courageous figure of the intellect and spirit, gave a new 
sense to the concept of freedom and the life of the individual?and then, 
dizzied, sat down to write his autobiography. One volume of it was 
enough for confirmation; he would never write the others. This was the 
volume in which he wrote about his parents. 
SILENCES 
Was it 
self-absorption or despair? We probably shall never know, for 
after a time the man who had once spoken openly and willingly stopped 
doing so; thus there was no occasion on which this question would 
readily come up. He was, he and his associates knew, quite busy: papers, 
letters, appointments. He had, as these accumulated, as his reputation 
grew, begun to talk more quickly, abruptly, always about to go on to 
something else. Then, sometimes, his acquaintances saw him just move 
his lips silently when they waited for an answer to their questions (they 
had before this given up expecting him to initiate conversations with 
them). And finally that stopped too, replaced by an intent and knowing 
look. It was clear that in these moments no discourtesy was intended. 
For when a questioner asked him why he did not answer the question 
that had been asked, he would respond, but in a raised voice, as if he were 
repeating what he had already said, with a note of impatience for the 
interlocutor who had failed to hear or grasp an answer already given. 
It is faster, we know, more economical, to think than to speak; one 
might conjecture from this that, contrary to the usual histories of the 
relation, speaking preceded thinking. Like writing, thinking may have 
been added to speaking in order to extend its use (so when we criticize 
someone for not thinking before he speaks, it may be that it is not bad 
judgment or stupidity that we criticize, but only a devotion to the past, 
a rehearsal of the species-memory). But what are we to make of the 
phenomenon of this man who believed he was speaking the words when 
he was only thinking the ideas? Did he, we might want to know, believe 
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that everything he thought was also spoken? For then, instead of that 
character of privacy and silence of which he stood accused, the taciturn 
cover for which, with mingled respect and suspicion, he was known? 
on his own view of himself he would have been quite open and accessi 
ble, virtually transparent. 
PARTIAL RECALL 
John said to Jane, "Let's forgive and forget. I explained to you what 
I did, and you told me why you did what you did. I think that you were 
wrong, and you probably still think that I was wrong. Let them cancel 
each other out?that's for forgiveness. And then, once we forgive each 
other, there's little left of what happened (in itself it didn't amount to 
much anyway); we may as well forget, too. We can act as if it had never 
happened?that's a way after all, in which it might never have hap 
pened." 
But Jane objected one time more. "I agree with what you say about 
forgiveness?since even if you were wrong (I still think you were), it 
doesn't make much difference now. Your intentions were good, as were 
mine; we've talked about what happened, and no great harm came of 
it anyway. Surely, then, we ought to forgive each other. But it's not 
possible or even right simply to forget. Shouldn 't we remember how the 
disagreement came up, what we found fault with each other about? That 
way, the next time something like this begins to happen, we can try to 
avoid it. Experience keeps a dear school, after all?but then, we should 
learn from it, shouldn't we? Even for what we need to know about 
ourselves and our relationship?we ought to remember. And anyway, it's 
no good pretending that forgetting is voluntary. The surest way to 
remember is to try not to; you know that as well as I do. With forgiving 
or without it, memory holds on?so let's agree; we forgive, but not 
forget." 
Have they omitted something, this John and Jane, always so thought 
ful, so prudently reasoned, so amiable towards each other? Perhaps only 
the likeliest of the combinations, one that would surface twenty years 
later in a form muted, so delicately extended, that the most devoted 
connoisseur of the art of the psyche could yet fail to recognize its 
origins, to see that in it, too, the present had had a past. I speak of the 
possibility that they?John, or Jane, or even, harmoniously, the two of 
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them at once?might indeed forget, put the history of their ideas aside, 
out of sight, but then discover that something else had lingered on. To 
forget, that is, but not to forgive. 
FILIAL IMPIETY 
"Every craftsman loves the work of his own hands more than he 
would be loved by it if it were to come to life." So the asceticism and 
humility of Aristotle show through the profusion of his thinking, his 
unwillingness to call anything in the whole of nature alien to him. A 
creator wills his own existence in what he creates; it is no wonder then 
that what he creates could never, even with life of its own to spend, even 
with a large and generous sense of indebtedness, match that will. 
The wisdom here is exemplary and chilling. For if Michelangelo's 
ardor would never have been requited by the Sistine Chapel, nor Mo 
zart's spirit by Don Giovanni, the spirit of the lover come to life; if 
Flaubert's passion for Mme Bovary could never have been returned, no 
matter what words he, her creator, forced her to utter (was it this 
inequity that led him, dying, to curse her willingness to survive him?)? 
why should we others feel slighted when we encounter the same evi 
dence in the one test to which many of us have ready access? We would 
love them anyway, after all?since they are, undeniably, our children. 
CATCHING A FISH 
We think of pain as expressive, noisy, distorting. Some people are 
better at concealing it than others, but even then we believe that we can 
recognize the concealment. We should be aware, however, of the terri 
ble mistake we may be making with such confidence in our power of 
interpretation, in the reading of signs. We know, for instance, the 
tradition of artistic creation, according to which internal pain offers 
itself to the outer world as beauty. This example, admittedly, is su 
perficial; often what it claims is not true at all, and at best it is idionsyn 
cratic, overdetermined. It is more than we need, in any event, since we 
can 
readily imagine that pain may be so great as to freeze or immobilize 
expression: agony in the register of silence. And we say?yes, we recog 
nize this, too: the lines or contortion of a face, the eyes rolled upward, 
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and so on. But here, again, our expectations may be too full, too 
dramatic. What, more simply, if certain moments were so painful, 
frozen by a thrust of a present that destroys the future, that only the 
expression of normalcy itself could remain for them as a face? 
We should, in fact, hardly expect anything more than this when pain 
is final, when it excises even the possibility of an alternative. But then, 
if this is so, surely we need to look again at the faces around us, those 
which we otherwise glance over as untouched, mute, expressionless. 
SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE 
The lines are drawn around anti-Semitism in strong and fixed con 
tours, without nuance, with little room left to doubt what they are 
pointing at: the Jew, the anti-Semite, the bystander who soon discovers 
that even in that role there is no innocence. But it is a mistake to 
conclude from such patterned constancy that imagination is not at work 
here, that the sameness in so many dispersed acts of violation has been 
only imitative, banal, predictable. The imagination, it seems, needs only 
a bit of matter, the slightest friction, to begin to secrete the layers of its 
pearl. All that it requires is an occasion, any occasion, including, we have 
to admit, those of evil as well as good. It is not necessarily moral light 
that brings a glow to the imagination. 
So, consider the list of 22 restrictions imposed on the Jews in Hamadan, 
Persia, 1892. Most of the rules are conventional, borrowed, probably not 
very interesting even in their first appearance?expressions of mere spite 
or nastiness, striking out. Thus, Regulation 6: "Jews are required to wear 
a badge of red cloth." Or, Regulation 7: "Jews are forbidden to build 
houses taller than those of a Muslim neighbor." Regulation 16: "The 
Jew cannot put on his coat. He must carry it rolled under his arm." But 
one item in the series shows an understanding of culture and personality 
that draws on almost untouched reaches of the spirit, areas that the 
twentieth-century invention of social science only approaches in its will 
to 
anticipate the extent of human action. So, Regulation 5: "Jews are 
forbidden to wear matching shoes." 
The reader with a practical turn of mind could understand this as 
only another, slightly ironical form of taxation: the Jew must buy two 
pairs of shoes in order to have even one; or, conversely, as a joke on 
excesses, the Jew cannot have one pair of shoes without having two. But 
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the impulse of the imagination is always more than utilitarian?and so 
here, too, with its proposal to violate the familiar order. Why should 
it be, we hear the unspoken question, that we insist that pairs should 
be similar, symmetrical, like? We know this custom immediately in our 
clothes: gloves, socks, sleeves, trouser legs. And even there, of course, 
we are imitating nature itself which is the most persistent spokesman 
for likeness, in its very invention of the pair: hands, legs, cheeks, eyes, 
eyebrows, breasts. To see the one of any of these is to predict the other?a 
constancy that does not trouble even the strongest admirers of difference 
and originality. Even where there are more than pairs (toes, fingers, 
teeth), we recognize still the control of symmetry, a subordination to 
the principles of analogy. Nature itself thus seems committed to 
an 
economy of repetition; burdened by the need always to invent, to make 
its own way, it seems then to crave familiarity, regularity, an order that 
provides comfort and at the same time discloses a character of careful 
deliberation, adherence to the priciple of equity. 
Only the freak, the grotesque interrupts that order?and the Muslim 
clergy of Hamadan who set the regulations prove that man can also will 
and create the incongruous, discover the means of lopsidedness and its 
indignities. They might, those vendors of religious artfulness, had they 
been more interested in logic, have also decreed that the mismatched 
shoes should be forbidden to walk together. (That rule, too, would later 
be imposed on the Jews, but with little art, presented directly as cruelty.) 
Perhaps only the innocence of a child could heal such violations?not 
by preventing it or avenging it, but by absorbing it. I once asked a young 
boy how it happened that one sock he was wearing was white and the 
other one brown. "Oh, that's the way they are," he reassured me; "I have 
another pair at home just like it." 
POINTING 
Philosophy has spent much of its wonder on intentions. The will, for 
Kant, is what ethical action is: consequences come and go, but none of 
them endures, none marks a sufficient starting point. Intentions, on the 
other hand, what the person willed to do: these remain after the act, 
even, because of the breach they make in time itself, after the life of 
the agent himself. 
It is just this idea of separation that has troubled the philosopher 
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recently. Because if an intention is separate from its consequent action, 
it also ought to have a place, a moment of its own?and where, we ask, 
is all that located? In the mind? At some hidden point in the line of 
action? Nothing visible answers. 
There is a malady in which, some have claimed, we may find the cure 
for such questions: like many cures, however, it seems to act slowly, to 
require more than only the assent or conviction of the patient. The 
doctors recognize a distinctive motion which they name the "intention 
tremor." With this condition a person, normally with steady hands, not 
nervous or distraught in any apparent way, concentrates on a particular 
object, focuses on it, grasps or reaches for it or only, perhaps, points at 
it: he intends it. Then the tremor appears. 
We may well be inclined to say that for this person as he acts, his 
intention is there, in his hands: the tremor, it is claimed, is unfailing 
as well as unmistakable. And surely hands do express designs and efforts 
more than any other part of the body, more even than the face, which 
remains, after all, however mobile its features, fixed always in one place. 
But if we incline in this direction, we have also to decide what shall 
be said for those people, the rest of us, in whom the tremor does not 
appear. Not, obviously, that we have no intentions?since with this, the 
field of innocence would be enlarged beyond conscience. One means of 
saving appearances would be in the claim that the intention tremor 
reflects truly what those of us without it have successfully learned to 
conceal. But that, of course, would be to say what is already well-known, 
and not only about intentions. 
NOVELTY 
We have been tested for survival, the biologists say, and not been 
found wanting. At least we have survived the competition for being 
born: many others would have wished to stand in our place. 
A strong argument, this, even with the appeal to vanity that colors 
a puritan monochrome: we are obliged to prove ourselves before we are 
born. The fact of life itself is thus a claim of merit; and the evidence 
for the claim comes from two sides, the first with a full hand of 
examples?opposable thumbs, posture erect, the tongue collaborating 
with the larynx. Who could have invented these singly, let alone in the 
conjunction of one body? And there, in fact, is also the evidence from 
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the second side. For although we may at times imagine to ourselves local 
improvements: a few inches off or on, a sharper, even a third eye?we 
do not think here of a different kind of body. Even when we wish for 
wings or claws, the thoughts pass quickly, children of circumstance and 
need. Those changes, we recognize, are borrowed from familiar bodies? 
birds, cats?not from figures of our invention. 
It seems then that we ought to be content when we cannot imagine 
an alternative. And in general we do not balk: the body takes up the 
space of thinking as well as of acting. Thus, it is perversity as much as 
an impulse of the spirit that leads us all to affect one moment that is 
in no way bound to survival, that even our genius for procreation has 
not the slightest chance of transmitting, that seems to have nothing to 
do with biology. This invention is sufficiently remote from the probabil 
ities insisted on by life to seem mere chance?were it not for the 
constancy of its appearances. Admittedly, we should not place much 
weight on this constancy, this repetition; it may in fact prove only how 
difficult and rare it is to be original even when we aspire to that ideal, 
even after we admit the importance of stepping outside the determina 
tions of history and biology. 
The only other explanation for death, it seems, is simple curiosity 
about what stands on the other side. And curiosity, we understand, is 
for biology even more improbable an event than originality. 
CHILDREN AND ADULTS 
Vice and virtue are usually opposed to each other as if each were only 
one thing. But although there may be one way to be good or to do right, 
it is clear that there are many ways to do wrong; this, rather than 
ignorance or the will to cause harm seems, in fact, to be the attraction 
of evil. 
And so, also, not least, with adultery, as it is counted among the large 
and destructive vices. Adult adultery and child adultery, I call two of 
those varieties. In the first adultery, of children: the act is committed 
for another end, to rectify the past, if only in pleasure, and thus to 
address others as well as oneself. The principal future for such adultery, 
of course, is disclosure: the beginning privacy of the act is consummated 
openly, when someone else knows, is made to know. This is a way, after 
all, to public status, to pain, to the dissolution of marriage (not any one 
marriage, but all marriage), to ends foreseen by all human beings. 
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And then there is adult adultery which comes close, by that inversion 
of history which we preserve as irony, to the traditional ideal of mar 
riage: two become one, not by man to be put asunder. A commitment 
so hedged by circumstance that the adulterers are aware, even those who 
do not 
spontaneously think of death, that the relation, the act, will die 
with them, known only to them, valued by the two of them alone. No 
progeny, no witnesses. The passion they have for each other can never 
be fed by the looks from outside which spur on most human efforts?not 
approval, not disapproval, not even mere curiosity. The history of the 
relation is entirely internal: no letters, no traces (for writers of history, 
it would not be history at all). Seclusion is a condition for openness 
between the pair; disclosure would make the passion impossible. So this 
adultery is held aside, in a space and time severed from the world; the 
cuts remain always open, the bruising of touch is their one but constant 
reminder of the world's body. The one possible breach in this relation 
is that the two people may come to think of it as a dream. Then, too, 
of course, they would not be separated, and some couples have even 
preferred to think of themselves in this way. 
(I do not deny a third possibility, the adultery of piety?where one 
person gives himself to another with no hope or expectation of return. 
It is an adultery of humility, this; there is nothing to be known or 
disclosed, for there is no act of joining?only the opening of a self and 
the impression it leaves, on the other person, on the bed. Very few people 
are 
capable of such giving; few are able to be recipients, moving neither 
to invite nor to direct, still less to take. There is a reasonable question 
whether these figures should be called adulterers at all: the one obviously 
has no commitment to violate, the other deprives marriage of no thing.) 
A FIT CRIME 
And what if the idea of punishment preceded, not followed wrong 
doing? See how we accept one piece of the temporal order as the whole: 
first, crime?then, punishment. But for the species, at its beginning, this 
history is reversed: first, the prohibition, the legislation of punishment? 
and then the crime. 
Looking backwards, one can easily understand this relation of cause 
and effect: prohibitions breed temptation even when their objects would 
not. (There could have been nothing special, after all, about one piece 
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of fruit in the midst of a large and ripe garden.) Temptation, desire, start 
from the sense of a 
mingling: a present which is yet alien, distanced. 
Desire becomes stronger, more urgent, as not the one, but the two sides 
of the prospect are real. Punishment, then, has at least the attraction of 
reality, and not only for the masochist: few moments in the net of 
experience are more decisive than pain. Even mere names draw on this 
power of ratification. Call someone a criminal?and it requires in that 
person rare asceticism not to give a part of himself to the name. Those 
who believe that titles or names are tokens of a world already fixed 
invoke the myth of a linguistic paradise. When the criminologist tells 
us, then, that a thief who is caught is more likely to repeat his crime 
than one who is not, we may object that he could know this only by 
magical vision?and yet we believe him anyway. Why should they, 
anyone, not live out the role which society, with its machines and 
weights, gives them? 
One important question, however, is left by this understanding. For 
if, historically?anthropologically, psychologically?prohibition and pun 
ishment precede crime, we can no longer claim that they have been 
designed to deter crime, not even, more simply, to right the balance of 
injustice. What remains of their origin, in fact, is precisely the lack of 
a 
cause?testimony to the lure of absence, and then to the difference 
between man and nature. Thus we understand that in a world where 
everything was permitted, where everything was given, something would 
yet be missing: the lure of prohibition. 
We see how powerful the attraction here can be when we realize that 
God Himself has not been exempt. Certainly He gave no reason for 
bringing prohibitions into the world; the first one, placed in Eden 
together with its many trees, is not even named among His creations. 
It is reasonable to suppose that He did not want to be questioned about 
this, that He Himself may have desired desire. 
ALONE 
There was once a man who prided himself on his sensitivity and his 
powers of empathy. He often boasted, in fact, that he not only could tell 
what his acquaintances and friends were feeling as he met them on the 
street or as he stood chatting with them?but more than this, that he 
felt their feelings, actually felt them. On a number of occasions he was 
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even heard to say, with a half-laugh in his voice, that he often could 
not tell whose feelings he was feeling?his own, or those of the people 
he was with. 
This was no smiling matter, I pointed out to him when he repeated 
this remark to me, the half-laugh still in his voice, in what turned out 
to be our last conversation. It might have something to do, I suggested, 
with the complaint he sometimes made that he did not enjoy solitude. 
Had he not said that when he was alone he felt quite empty? 
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